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{PRIVATE } 
 Financial Liberalisation, Stockmarkets  
 and Economic Development1 
 
 Ajit Singh 
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries (DCs) have 
been engaged in far-reaching reforms of their financial systems, 
liberalising them and making them more market-oriented. This 
liberalisation, involving inter alia ‘financial de-repression’ has 
been inspired partly by the work of the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973) [M-S] school.  
 
This paper suggests that, in addition to financial de-repression, 
there has been a major new element in the development of DC financial 
systems in recent years - the establishment and fast expansion of 
stockmarkets. These markets have played a key role in the internal 
as well as external financial liberalisation processes in leading 
DCs.  Further, the paper finds that the actual behaviour of these 
markets in many countries has led to outcomes which undermine the 
effects of the higher real interest rates arising from 'financial 
de-repression'. These important empirical phenomena have received 
scant attention from M-S economists,who need to incorporate them 
into their analysis of financial liberalisation. However, for DCs, 
the essential question is:  what will be the impact of these 
                     
1
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 2 
developments on industrialisation and long-term economic growth? 
 This paper argues that in general financial liberalisation and 
the associated expansion of stockmarkets in DCs is likely to hinder 
rather than assist their development. 
 
The paper concentrates on the role of the stockmarkets in the 
liberalisation process in DCs in the 1980s and 1990s, and explores, 
among other things, their effects on the financing of corporate 
growth.  The observed financing patterns will be seen to contradict 
the predictions of most economic models, and are therefore 
surprising not just for the M-S, but also for other economists. 
 At the macro-economic level, the paper considers foreign portfolio 
flows, the interactions between the stock and the currency markets, 
and their implications for the stability of the real economy and 
its long-term growth.  
 
I: FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION AND STOCKMARKET EXPANSION IN DCs 
Financial reforms in semi-industrial countries in the last decade 
have been characterised by an enormous growth of stockmarkets.  
Between 1983 and 1993, the combined capitalization of companies 
quoted on the 38 emerging markets in the Economist's list rose from 
less than a hundred billion to nearly a trillion US dollars (Feldman 
and Kumar (1994)); the corresponding growth of industrial country 
markets was a little over three-fold - from three to ten trillion 
dollars.  Several leading individual emerging markets (eg. Mexico, 
Korea and Thailand) recorded during this period a twenty-fold 
increase in market capitalization, which made them larger than  
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the average medium-sized European stockmarket.  
 
Relative to GDP, market capitalization  rose at an unprecedented 
rate  in leading DCs during the 1980s.  Mullin (1993) notes that 
it probably took eighty-five years (1810-1895) for the US 
capitalization ratio to rise from 7% to 71%, whilst the Taiwanese 
ratio rose from 11% to 74% in just ten years (1981-1991).  Feldman 
and Kumar's data show that the corresponding ratio for Chile 
increased from 13.2% in 1983 to 78% in 1993; for Mexico from 2% 
to 43%; for Thailand from 3.8% to 55.8%, etc.  Other development 
indicators for emerging stockmarkets reveal similar growth.  For 
example, the total value of shares traded on DC markets rose over 
twenty-five fold between 1983 and 1992, from two to ten percent 
of the global total (IFC, 1993).  
    
However, despite their recent rapid development, even the most 
advanced emerging markets are not yet mature. Typically most trading 
occurs in a few stocks which account for a considerable part of 
the total market capitalization.  Leaving aside these 
actively-traded blue-chip shares, there are serious informational 
and disclosure deficiencies for other stocks.  There are similar 
weaknesses in the transparency of transactions on these markets. 
The less developed of the stockmarkets suffer from a far wider range 
of such deficits.
2
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Apart from their role in domestic financial liberalisation, the 
stockmarkets have also been very important in recent years in 
external financial liberalization of DCs.  In the 1990s, these 
markets have emerged as a major channel for foreign capital flows 
to DCs.  International equity flows to the Economist's 38 emerging 
markets increased from $3.3 billion in 1986 to $61.2 billion in 
1993.
3
  Indeed, as the IMF economists El-Erian and Kumar (1995) 
note "when compared to other episodes of large private capital flows 
to developing countries in the last 20 years, the [present] 
phenomenon differs in one basic respect: the dominant role of 
foreign portfolio flows as opposed to bank financing".  These 
portfolio flows have taken place through several channels as 
external liberalization has progressed: country or regional funds; 
direct purchase of DC stocks by industrial country investors; the 
placement of DC equities on industrial country markets.  Both 
"push" (e.g.lower U.S. interest rates in the early 1990s) and "pull" 
factors (e.g. external liberalization in DCs) have contributed to 
these huge portfolio flows to emerging markets (Fernandez-Arias 
and Montiel, 1996; Smith and Walter, 1996). 
 
II: THE STOCKMARKET AND THE MCKINNON-SHAW ANALYSIS 
Despite their substantial present and growing practical 
significance for DCs outlined above, stockmarkets have received 
little empirical attention from M-S economists.
4
  This is puzzling 
                     
3
  El-Erian and Kumar, 1995, table 3. 
4
  An apparent justification provided for this neglect is that in the DCs there 
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since at the theoretical level, stockmarket development is 
acknowledged to be of critical importance to M-S analyses (Cho, 
1986; McKinnon, 1988). In their seminal paper, Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) showed that under imperfect information, because of the 
"adverse selection" and "incentive" effects, credit-rationing may 
not just be due to financial repression but could also arise from 
the normal competitive operations of the credit markets. Accepting 
this criticism, M-S economists therefore now suggest that 
credit-rationing reduces economic growth only if the "financially 
repressed" interest rate is below the competitive equilibrium 
credit-rationing rate; they, however, provide no guidance on how 
to distinguish in practice between the two rates. 
 
Be that as it may, Cho (1986) showed analytically that to achieve 
efficient resource allocation, credit markets need to be 
supplemented by a well-functioning equity market. This is because, 
unlike bank borrowings, equity finance is not subject to adverse 
                                                                
is only a small or negative flow of net resources from the household to the 
business sector via the stockmarket.  It is further suggested that the 
stockmarket affects only the largest firms.  However, following this logic, 
the stockmarket would not be regarded as important in the world's leading 
stockmarket economies, i.e. the US and the UK.  Corbett and Jenkinson (1995) 
suggest that over the period 1970-1989,  the stockmarket made a net negative 
contribution to the financing of corporate investment in the UK, and a small 
positive one overall in the US.  Moreover, in both countries, only a relatively 
small number of large firms tend to be listed.  Nevertheless, these listed 
companies account for a considerable proportion of industrial production, as 
indeed such firms do in leading DCs.   
 More importantly, stockmarkets can influence the economy through a 
variety of other channels, some direct (e.g. takeovers) and some indirect (e.g. 
macroeconomic signalling, interactions between the foreign exchange and the 
stockmarkets).  Such channels have become increasingly important for DCs in 
the recent period as discussed in the text. 
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selection and moral hazard effects under the conditions assumed. 
 Cho, therefore, concluded that substantial development of equity 
markets is essential for successful financial liberalisation
5
 and 
in the absence of such markets there is a case for government 
intervention.  However, there are difficulties with Cho's 
theoretical formulation. It overlooks (a) the fact that even with 
well-functioning stockmarkets there is an agency problem with 
respect to management-controlled large corporations; and (b) the 
problems arising from asymmetric information between corporate 
management and investors about project returns.  As Myers and 
Majluf (1984) showed, in these circumstances, rational managers 
will adopt the 'pecking order' pattern of finance - preferring 
retained earnings to debt and only as a last resort tapping the 
equity market to raise finance for their investment needs. Thus, 
firms under asymmetric information can effectively be 
equity-rationed. If they are also credit-rationed and have 
insufficient retained profits to finance worthwhile projects, such 
projects will not be undertaken, resulting in socially sub-optimal 
investment. 
 
As for the actual operation of DC stockmarkets, section V will show 
that in the 1980s these markets did not complement the effects of 
credit market reforms but rather in important respects subverted 
them.  During that decade many DCs implemented credit market 
                     
 
5
 See also McKinnon (1988). 
  
 
 7 
liberalisation and raised real interest rates.  However, this 
increased only the price of debt capital, but not all capital.  
For the reasons presented in section IV, there was a share price 
boom in many of these economies.  The consequent sharp fall in the 
price of equity capital seriously undermined and indeed allowed 
large private corporations to bypass altogether the main channel 
of high real interest rates through which the M-S effects are 
supposed to operate. 
 
Fry (1996) argues that the new work on finance and economic growth 
based on endogenous growth models strengthens the theoretical 
foundations of M-S analysis.
6
 This work suggests inter alia that 
stockmarkets lead to faster economic growth - a thesis contested 
below.   
 
III: WELL-FUNCTIONING STOCKMARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In principle, a well-functioning stockmarket should affect economic 
development through channels similar to those by which the 
equilibrium interest rate is expected to influence it in M-S models
7
, 
i.e. through raising (a) the savings rate, (b) the quantity and 
(c) the quality of investments. However, unlike the interest rate, 
the stockmarket can in addition ensure through the takeover 
                     
6
There is an important difference of emphasis between the M-S economists and 
the new endogenous financial models.  Some of the latter propose a fast and 
deliberate development of stock markets in developing countries in contrast 
to the traditional view of slow evolutionary growth favoured by Fry and others. 
7The precise mechanisms are different in the two cases; on interest rates see 
Fry (1995); on the stockmarket see Singh (1993). 
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mechanism that past investments are (d) also most profitably 
utilised. 
 
In the recent endogenous models of finance and development, King 
and Levine (1993) emphasise the merits of financial intermediation 
with respect to the promotion of technical progress and 
entrepreneurship. Others have stressed the risk-sharing, 
monitoring and screening functions which the stockmarket may 
perform with respect to new investment projects (Allen, 1993). 
Levine and Zervos (1995) suggest that the two main channels of 
financial intermediation - banks and the stockmarket - complement 
each other. Atje and Jovanovic (1993) however conclude that whilst 
stockmarkets positively effect growth, raising it by a huge 2.5 
percent p.a., banks have little influence.  
 
The empirical work in the above contributions is mostly based on 
Barro-type inter-country cross-section analysis. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1996) note its important methodological limitations 
with respect to establishing causality. The limitations are 
particularly serious in the present context since these empirical 
exercises represent reduced form analyses, and do not consider the 
precise channels through which the stockmarket performs its tasks 
(a to d). The relevant channels are (1) the pricing process and 
(2) the takeover mechanism. 
The stockmarket critics contend that contrary to the theory, these 
two mechanisms in practice operate imperfectly so that even 
well-functioning stockmarkets (such as those in the U.S. and the 
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U.K.) do not perform the monitoring, screening and disciplinary 
function at all well.  For example, both analytical work and 
evidence suggest that the actual stockmarket prices, although they 
may be reasonably efficient in Tobin's (1984) 'information 
arbitrage sense', are subject to whims and fads, are often dominated 
by the "noise traders" and are therefore not necessarily efficient 
in the critical sense of reflecting fundamental values.
8
 Similarly, 
on the takeover mechanism, empirical evidence suggests that 
competitive selection in the market for corporate control takes 
place much more on the basis of size than performance.  Due to 
various capital market imperfections, a large unprofitable firm 
has a greater survival probability than a small efficient firm. 
 Indeed, the former may increase its chances of survival by further 
increasing its size through the takeover process itself.
9
 
 
The critical school further contends that the actual operation of 
the pricing and takeover mechanisms in the well-functioning U.S. 
and U.K. stockmarkets leads to short-termism and lower rates of 
long-term investment particularly in firm-specific human capital.
10
 
 It also generates perverse incentives, rewarding managers for 
their success in financial engineering rather than creating new 
wealth through organic growth.  These deficiencies are thought to 
put the Anglo-Saxon economies at a competitive disadvantage with 
                     
8For a review of the issues and evidence see JEP (1990). 
9For a recent review of corporate takeovers see Singh(1992). 
10For a review of the issues see Singh (1995b), Porter(1992): For an opposite 
perspective, see Marsh (1992). 
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respect to Japan and Germany which operate without hostile takeovers 
and where historically various other institutional structures (e.g. 
group-banking relationships) have insulated industrial firms from 
the vagaries of the stockmarket.
11
 
 
IV:  STOCKMARKETS AND DCS: RECENT EXPERIENCE 
There are important implications of the above analysis for DCs which 
require  examination. 
 
Stockmarkets and Economic Development 
If even well-organised stockmarkets do not perform their 
disciplinary, allocative and other tasks satisfactorily and may 
impair international competitiveness, DC markets are likely to do 
worse in these respects.   This is because even leading emerging 
markets (e.g. Taiwan or India) do not possess the regulatory 
infrastructure for well-functioning markets
12
, or adequate 
information-gathering and disseminating private firms.  Moreover, 
the young listed firms on these markets will not have long enough 
records for their reputations to be accurately assessed.  All this 
will lead to a noisy stockmarket environment, with arbitrary pricing 
and considerable volatility (Tirole, 1991).  In such 
circumstances, the monitoring, screening and disciplining 
                     
11Porter (1992); Dore (1985). 
12 With respect to Taipei, the Economist (9 September, 1989) noted, "Taiwan's 
stockmarket is a rigged casino with a phenomenal turnover...Its 
family-controlled firms equate accountancy with tax-evading creativity.  Its 
courts react...to the nudges of the influential. ...it is as free-wheeling 
and corrupt as the Philippines, but ... is a free-wheel that works."(p. 20) 
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functions of the stockmarkets may be more efficiently performed 
by certain kinds of financial intermediaries, e.g. the 
group-banking system traditionally found in Germany and Japan 
(Mayer, 1989). 
 
A central weakness of a stockmarket system with respect to 
finance-industry relationships is that it provides investors with 
almost instant liquidity.  Although seen as a virtue by orthodox 
economists, this liquidity also means that the investors need have 
no long-term commitment to the firm (Bhide, 1994).
13
  By contrast, 
the group-banking dominated financial systems can ensure such 
commitment.  Further, because of the close bank-corporation 
relationships in these systems, group-banks can cope much better 
with asymmetric information, agency costs and transaction costs 
than the Anglo-Saxon stockmarket system (Hoshi et al., 1991; Allen 
and Gale, 1995). 
                     
13 Levine and Zervos (1995) and Atje and Jovanovic (1993) find in their 
econometric work a positive relationship between stockmarket liquidity (proxied 
by turnover) and economic development.  However, as noted earlier, the question 
of causality there is problematical.  For example, in some high-growth 
countries such as Taiwan it may be perverse to ascribe causality to stockmarket 
liquidity even if there is perfect co-movement between the two variables.  
This is because the Economist's description of the Taiwanese stockmarket as 
a "rigged casino with a phenomenal turnover" in note 10 is an apt one. In 1989 
the average value of shares traded for each three-hour trading day on the Taipei 
stockmarket was nearly three billion dollars.  That was one billion dollars 
a day more than in London, and more than half of New York's trading.  On 28 
August 1989, Taipei recorded a trading volume of 7.6 billion dollars.  The 
world's biggest stockmarket, Tokyo, traded just 4.2 billion dollars worth of 
shares on the same day. Share prices on the Taiwanese market in the relevant 
period were subject to huge medium-term swings which were not justified by 
changes in economic prospects. Singh (1993). This kind of high turnover of 
shares may be generated by a public taste for speculation and gambling. It 
is likely to diminish rather than promote economic growth as it undermines 
the capitalistic ethic by destroying the link between effort and reward. 
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Stockmarket Volatility, Corporate Finance, Savings and Investment 
For the reasons outlined above, share prices in emerging markets 
may be expected to fluctuate more than those in well-developed 
markets.  However, a high degree of volatility is a negative feature 
of a stockmarket for several reasons: (a) it can undermine the 
financial system as a whole; (b) it makes share prices much less 
useful as a guide to resource allocation; (c)  to the extent that 
it discourages risk-averse savers and investors, it raises the cost 
of capital to corporations; (d) it may also stop risk-averse firms 
from raising funds, or (e) even from seeking a listing on the 
stockmarket (Pagano, 1993). 
 
Evidence supports the prediction of much higher share price 
volatility in DCs compared with industrial countries (Davis, 1995). 
 In extreme cases El-Erian and Kumar (1995) report that between 
1983 and 1993 stockmarket volatility in Mexico was nearly fifteen 
times and in Turkey more than twenty times as large as that in the 
U.S. or Japan. There is also evidence of information-arbitrage 
inefficiency in DC share prices (Claessens, 1995).  More 
significantly, share prices in many emerging markets would appear 
to have deviated considerably from fundamentals in the share price 
booms of the last decade (see below). 
 
However, some of the implications of stockmarket volatility are 
not supported by the DC experience during the last 15 years.  During 
this period, not only has there been a big increase in emerging 
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market activity and listings, but DC firms have been raising 
considerable capital on stockmarkets.   
 
In the first large-scale empirical studies of corporate finance 
for DCs, Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995a) examined the 
financing of corporate growth of net assets (i.e. the long term 
capital employed in the firm) in the 1980s in several countries 
- India, Turkey, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, Zimbabwe, Korea, 
Jordan, Pakistan and Mexico.  Singh's (1995a) sample normally 
consisted of the top 100 listed corporations in each country.  This 
research showed that large DC corporations rely heavily in general 
on (a) external funds, and (b) new share issues to finance their 
growth of net assets.  In five of the ten sample countries, over 
70 percent of  corporate growth during the past decade was financed 
from external funds.  In another two, the external financing 
proportion was more than half.  Similarly, the importance of equity 
finance for DC corporations is indicated by the fact that in five 
of the nine sample countries with the relevant data over 40 percent 
of the growth of net assets in the 1980s was financed by new share 
issues.  In another two countries, equity finance accounted for 
over 25 percent of corporate growth during the relevant period. 
 
These results are surprising for several reasons, including some 
suggested earlier.  The DC financing pattern is not only different 
from that observed in advanced countries, it is also 
counter-intuitive and contrary to the predictions of most economic 
models.  Advanced country corporations normally follow the 
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"pecking order" and issue very little equity, being funded largely 
by retained profits.
14
  In view of the serious capital market 
imperfections and high volatility, DC corporations may be expected 
to rely much more on internal rather than external funds, and resort 
far less to equity finance than industrial country firms.  Further, 
since the former are more likely to be family-controlled than the 
latter, this should also discourage corporate equity issuance for 
fear of losing control.   
 
How then are the anomalous phenomena of the fast expansion of 
stockmarket listings in DCs and the heavy reliance on equity finance 
by the big DC corporations in the recent period to be explained? 
 Singh (1995a) provides a set of interlinked hypotheses to account 
for these observations.  Briefly, the stage of development theory 
of equity financing is rejected.  It is argued that unlike the U.S. 
and the U.K. in the 19th century, stockmarket development in DCs 
today is not simply an evolutionary response to market forces.  
Rather, for various reasons (e.g. privatisation programmes), many 
DC governments have played a major proactive role in the expansion 
of these markets. 
 
Further, Singh (1995a) suggests that an essential reason why DC 
corporations resorted so much to equity financing in the 1980s was 
that the relative cost of equity capital fell significantly during 
these years.  This was due to a large rise in share prices which 
                     
 
14  Mayer (1990); see however Meeks and Whittington (1975) and Singh (1995a). 
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was in turn brought about by both internal and external financial 
liberalization.
15
  At the same time, the relative cost of debt 
financing increased because of the steep rise in international 
interest rates as well as financial de-repression measures which 
several countries embarked on during this period.  Thus, the cost 
of equity capital relative to that of debt became much more 
favourable to equities during the course of the 1980s.  To 
illustrate, Amsden and Euh (1990) note that in 1980 the average 
price/earnings ratio on the Korean stockmarket was about 3, and 
therefore roughly, the cost of capital through share issues was 
33%.  By 1989, the average price/earnings ratios had risen to 14 
reducing the cost of equity capital to 7.1%.  Euh and Barker (1990) 
estimate that in terms of cash flow, taking into account the tax 
element, the latter cost to the Korean corporations in 1989 was 
only 3%.  This compares with a figure of 12.5% for preferential 
commercial bank loans.  
 
Thus, contrary both to M-S and other economists' expectations, DC 
stockmarkets have contributed significantly to corporate growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  However, important questions from the 
perspective of long-term economic growth are: has this led to 
increased aggregate savings and investments, or raised the 
                     
13 Prior to liberalization,  most DC savers had limited returns and avenues 
for savings due to financial repression.  With internal liberalization and 
easier access to the stockmarket, share ownership and stockmarket participation 
greatly increased in many countries in the 1980s.  Further, a significant 
additional source of demand for DC corporate equities  came from advanced 
country institutional investors seeking to achieve portfolio diversification 
(Singh, 1995a). 
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productivity of investments.  These issues have not been 
systematically investigated for most DCs (Claessens, 1995).  Some 
useful evidence for India, however, is provided by Nagaraj (1996). 
 This shows that financial liberalisation and capital market growth 
in the 1980s in that country led simply to portfolio substitution 
from bank deposits to tradeable securities rather than greater 
aggregate national or financial savings.
16
  Nagaraj notes that 
despite the stockmarket boom of that decade and the substantial 
resources raised there by Indian corporations, corporate investment 
in fixed assets declined.  Nor does he find evidence of increased 
output growth in the private corporate sector.  Both Singh (1995a) 
and Nagaraj report a secular fall in corporate profitability in 
India during the 1980s, which could in principle be due to product 
market liberalization.   However, it then becomes difficult to 
explain the stockmarket boom except in terms of market psychology 
and speculation (see also below). 
 
External Liberalisation, the Stockmarket and the Real Economy 
Foreign portfolio investment, following external financial 
liberalisation in DCs, has been particularly important for the 
foreign exchange-constrained Latin American economies in the recent 
period.  The enormous portfolio flows to these countries in the 
1990s helped to alleviate the constraint and enabled a modest 
economic growth (about 3.5% p.a. during 1990-94) after the 'lost 
                     
 
16 For scattered evidence on these issues for other countries, see Singh (1993, 
1995a). 
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decade' of the 1980s.  At the microeconomic level, the portfolio 
inflows helped generate the stockmarket boom, lowering the cost 
of capital to Latin American corporations.  In Mexico, considerable 
inflow went into the stockmarket and leaving aside the question 
of fluctuations, the share price index rose from 250 in 1989 to 
around 2500 in 1994. 
 
However, as Rodrik (1994) and Krugman (1995) point out these 
portfolio flows to Latin America were not responding to fundamentals 
but represented a misplaced euphoria and a 'herd' instinct.  The 
market was not rewarding virtue, frugality and restraint, but in 
many countries subsidising consumption at the expense of 
investment.  Despite evidence that countries like Mexico were 
running huge current account deficits and using inflows largely 
for current consumption, such flows continued.  The Mexican trade 
balance shifted from a small surplus in 1988 to a deficit of US 
$20 billion in 1993;  the current account deficit was about 6% of 
GDP in 1993 and 9% in 1994.  Financial and trade liberalisation 
policies led to a fall in private savings from roughly 15% to 5% 
of GDP despite high interest rates (Taylor, 1996). Notwithstanding 
huge capital inflows in the 1990s, Mexico's rate of economic growth 
during 1990-94 was only 2.5% p.a.- barely equal to the rate of 
population growth. 
 
The speculative bubble burst in December 1994 when portfolio flows 
to Mexico suddenly stopped.  Share prices fell sharply not only 
in Mexico but also, through the "contagion" effect, in most emerging 
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markets.
17
  The impact on the real economy was devastating - real 
GDP fell by 7% in 1995 in Mexico and by 5% in Argentina.  Thus, 
even when financial markets have been expansionary
18
, their 
bandwagon and herd characteristics generate considerable 
instability for the real economy. 
 
Portfolio capital was recommended to DCs for being less vulnerable 
to external interest rate shocks than debt (WIDER, 1990).  However, 
in practice these inflows have proved to be just as destabilizing. 
 As Akyuz (1993) points out, external liberalisation through 
opening stockmarkets to non-residents leads to close links between 
two inherently unstable markets even when the capital account is 
not fully open - the stock and currency markets.  Faced with an 
economic shock the two markets may interact with each other in a 
negative feed-back loop to produce even greater instability for 
the markets and the whole financial system.  Moreover, the 
gyrations in these markets may discourage aggregate investment 
through various channels, e.g. depressing business expectations 
because of greater uncertainty; greater instability in aggregate 
consumption because of wealth effects caused by large fluctuations 
in stockmarket prices.  These factors contribute to the instability 
of the real economy and may also reduce long-term economic growth. 
                     
17"The Mexican financial crisis...resulted in a linked collapse of stockmarket 
values in almost all developing countries, regardless of economic policies 
and performance.  The 'contagion` effect was clear..." (Smith and Walter, 1996, 
underlining added) 
18  In advanced countries, financial markets have generally worked in a 
"deflationary" way, penalizing governments which follow expansionary policies. 
 Singh (1996a). 
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Such negative feedback effects will be particularly pronounced if 
external financial liberalisation is carried out in 
'dis-equilibrium' conditions of high and unpredictable inflation 
and fluctuating exchange rates.  However, because of the structural 
characteristics of DCs which makes them more subject to external 
and internal shocks than advanced economies, many of these 
unfavourable outcomes are likely to prevail even under "normal" 
conditions, and even if there were a correct "sequencing" of 
financial reforms. 
 
V: CONCLUSION 
Stockmarket development has been an important part of both internal 
and external financial liberalization in DCs in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 The process is continuing with the encouragement of the Bretton 
Woods institutions - several more stockmarkets are being currently 
established in Africa and in transition economies. 
 
This paper concludes that these developments are unlikely to help 
in achieving quicker industrialisation and faster long-term 
economic growth in most DCs.  This is for several reasons.  First, 
the inherent volatility and arbitrariness of the stockmarket 
pricing process under DC conditions make it a poor guide to efficient 
investment allocation.  Secondly, the interactions between the 
stock and currency markets in the wake of unfavourable economic 
shocks may exacerbate macroeconomic instability and reduce 
long-term growth.  Thirdly, stockmarket development is likely to 
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undermine the existing industry group-banking systems in DCs, 
which, despite their many difficulties, have not been without merit 
in several countries, not least in the highly successful East Asian 
economies.
19
 
 
This is not to overlook the problems with such systems in  other 
DCs (e.g. monopolistic abuses; inadequate government regulations 
(Singh, 1993)). However, even these countries would have been better 
off  reforming and expanding their extant industry group-banking 
systems rather than establishing stockmarkets.
20
  Reforming the 
existing system would not only have absorbed less resources 
directly, it would also have been an easier option in terms of 
institutional capacity for the concerned DCs
21
, compared with the 
infrastructure required for well-functioning stockmarkets.    
 
Stockmarkets are potent symbols of capitalism but paradoxically 
capitalism often flourishes better without their hegemony.  
Contrary to World Bank (1989), stockmarket expansion is not a 
necessary natural progression of a country's financial development. 
Historically, such progression has not occurred in leading 
                     
19 On the relationships between banks and industry in East Asian economies, 
see for example Cho (1989), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Kojima (1995), Singh 
1996b). 
20 See further Akyuz (1993). 
21
 If an DC is not capable of running an above-board banking system, the 
establishment of a stockmarket is unlikely to help and may compound the problem. 
 The recent history of both DCs and advanced countries is rife with stockmarket 
scandals, e.g. the huge 1992 stockmarket scam in India and regular scandals 
in Taiwan and Japan. 
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continental European economies.  In the more recent post-World War 
II period countries like Germany and Italy have been able to achieve 
their economic miracles with little assistance from the stockmarket 
(de Cecco, 1993; Pagano, 1993).  Stockmarkets have  also played 
little role in the post-war industrialisation of Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan (World Bank, 1993).  There is evidence that Japan 
deliberately encouraged the development of the banking system 
rather than the stockmarket after World War II (Somel, 1992).  
Developing countries simply cannot afford the luxury of  
stockmarkets.  As Keynes (1936, p.159) noted, "when the capital 
development of a country becomes the by-product of the activities 
of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."
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University of Cambridge 
                     
22This paper is concerned with analytical rather than policy issues. However, 
in the post-cold-war international economic order, since realistically, 
whatever their merits, DC stockmarkets are now here to stay, Singh (1993, 1994) 
has suggested two areas of immediate concern. The first involves the control 
of portfolio capital flows. Many countries, including notably Chile and South 
Korea, restrict such flows to their economic advantage (Akyuz and Cornford 
1994). In the wake of the Mexican crisis, now even the IMF and the BIS accept 
the wisdom of such controls (BIS, 1995). The important analytical point here 
is to throw sand into the interactions between the foreign exchange and the 
stockmarkets, even if it may be infeasible and/or undesirable to sever the 
connection altogether.  The second area concerns the market for corporate 
control which can compound the negative effects of stockmarkets.  Singh (1994) 
suggests there are structural factors which make the "spontaneous" emergence 
of such a market imminent in many DCs.  He argues on efficiency grounds that 
such an evolution should be curbed.  The cross of the stockmarket is heavy 
enough for the DCs to bear without being landed also with an Anglo-Saxon-type 
market for corporate control. 
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